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Book Review
Tabula Rama
Ramachandran, V. S. (2011). The tell-tale brain: Unlocking the mystery of
human nature. London: William Heinemann. pp. 384. ISBN 978-0434020232.
£20.00
The table of the self can continue to stand without one of the legs, but if too many
are lost its stability becomes severely compromised. (Ramachandran, 2011, p. 253)
What a fabulous book! Ironically, it is ‘‘fabulous’’ to a degree that will
unsettle many scientists, as Ramachandran’s ratio of fables-to-facts may
exceed what they can tolerate. As Ramachandran notes: ‘‘In doing science
one is often forced to choose between providing precise answers to boring (or
trivial) questions such as, How many cones are there in the human eye? or
vague answers to big questions such as, What is consciousness?’’ (p. 311).
Ramachandran is no cone counter, and one’s opinion of his book may
depend on just how vague one considers his answers to be to the big
questions he raises.
These big questions are treated in nine chapters, which partially fuse to
form seven ‘‘legs’’ supporting Ramachandran’s table*his thesis of the
uniqueness of human nature. Chapters 1 and 2 address phantom limbs, and
visual perception and cognition, respectively. These chapters recycle material
from two of Ramachandran’s former books and are based on his most
influential experimental contributions to the scientific literature. The
relevant arguments in favour of human uniqueness here are plasticity and
(visual) awareness. Although Ramachandran appreciates that animals do
have phantom limbs and do show cortical remapping after the loss of a limb,
he notes that the plasticity seen in the human brain (‘‘Homo plasticus’’)
dwarfs that of nonhuman primates. In Chapter 2, he presents a useful and
entertaining introduction to the different visual pathways and their
functional dissociability, which may produce apparently paradoxical beha-
viours such as those observed in blindsight or Capgras delusion. I have the
impression that ‘‘A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human’’ (the
subtitle of the US edition) was not the primary motivation for including
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these chapters. Rather, I suspect it was the appeal of intriguing somatosen-
sory and visual phenomena, the vivid description of which Ramachandran is
justly renowned for. The argument of human hyperneuroplasticity seems to
be quantitative rather than qualitative, and his discussion of the emergence
of visual awareness via phylogenetically new visual pathways does not add a
particularly novel twist to the ongoing debate about human versus animal
consciousness.
Let us then proceed to three more legs of Ramachandran’s table. The
synaesthesia/creativity connection is one (Chapter 3); it is closely attached to
the leg of mirror neurons (Chapters 4 and 5), which itself can barely be
separated from that of language (Chapter 6). ‘‘Loud Colors and Hot Babes:
Synesthesia’’ revisits the descriptions familiar from ‘‘Purple Numbers and
Sharp Cheese’’ (Chapter 4 in Ramachandran, 2004). At some length*but
every single line pays dividends*we are persuaded that synaesthetic pairings
of digit and colour are not just learned associations. Consider, for example,
‘‘Susan’’, who experiences a 7 in black print as red, does not have any colour
impression for the Roman numeral VII, needs some time to build up a
colour percept when a 7 is drawn on her skin, experiences a whole rainbow of
colours when listening to someone speaking aloud ‘‘seven, five, three, two,
eight . . .’’, and finds a 7 printed in green hideous. It is difficult to determine
whether an animal can experience synaesthesia or how far its faculty for
cross-modal associations might be developed; hence, what Ramachandran
proposes as uniquely human is synaesthesia as a principle that goes beyond
the merging of the senses on a phenomenal level. In a sense, he writes, we are
all synaesthetes when automatically (and universally) matching the name
‘‘bouba’’ with an undulating amoeba-contoured line drawing, but ‘‘kiki’’ with
a jagged form resembling a piece of shattered glass (see later).
In Chapter 4, Ramachandran introduces ‘‘the neurons that shaped
civilization’’, i.e., mirror neurons, the type of brain cells whose purported
functional range embraces just about everything, from low-level visuomotor
matching to the most abstract forms of mind reading. That, at any rate, is
how mirror neurons are described in the popular press, and Ramachandran’s
description is almost as effusive. He first delineates how mirror neurons were
discovered in the monkey ventral premotor cortex and subsequently also in
inferior parietal areas. He then describes a class of ‘‘sensory mirror neurons’’
that fire not only when touch or painful stimuli are directed to one’s own
body, but also when tactile stimulation of another person is visually
observed. It is not just frontal inhibitory circuits that are involved in
preventing a person from literally feeling another person’s touch and pain,
but also active ‘‘null signals’’ from one’s corresponding tactile receptors,
which remain unstimulated. Accordingly, Ramachandran describes an
amputee whose ‘‘null signals’’ could no longer reach the brain and who
felt observed touch on his phantom limb. As exceptional as such a case
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might seem, empathy for pain that reaches the quality of sensation is now
recognised as relatively common in amputees (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).
In a lengthy footnote, Ramachandran convincingly rebuts a number of
common doubts about the general importance of the human mirror neuron
system. He notes that several properties of mirror neurons are crucial in an
evolutionary sense. First, they allow us not only to see the world from our
conspecifics’ vantage point, but also to take the other’s conceptual stance
(‘‘I see your point’’), and to imitate abstract thought in addition to motor
action. In the most general sense, mirror neurons thus enabled the transition
from slow-motion genetic evolution to the sudden leaps possible in cultural
evolution. Without a sophisticated mirror system, incidental innovations,
such as fire making, could never have spread across early hominid societies
with the rapidity they did. For a discussion of the controversy about the role
of mirror neurons in the theory-of-mind deficits that characterise the autistic
spectrum disorders (Chapter 5), I refer the interested reader to the discussion
in Gallese, Gernsbacher, Heyes, Hickok, and Iacoboni (2011). Suffice it to
say that, for Ramachandran, the evidence clearly speaks in favour of
‘‘broken mirrors’’ or at least a dormant mirror system at the heart of autism.
Who would want to miss a discussion of language in the list of uniquely
human faculties? This is presented in Ramachandran’s next chapter, ‘‘The
Power of Babble: The Evolution of Language’’. Why were the genes involved
in shaping a purported language acquisition device selected in the first place?
Ramachandran’s answer might surprise every linguist. The sound of object
nouns shows a nonarbitrary correspondence to the object’s visual features:
proof is the boubakiki experiment referred to earlier. Mediation of the cross-
modal abstraction involved in bringing together vision and sound are mirror
neurons in Broca’s area. Ramachandran speculates that these might also
mediate the relationship between mouth (tongue, lip, etc.), posture, and the
produced sound: in ‘‘fudge’’, ‘‘trudge’’, ‘‘sludge’’, and ‘‘smudge’’ the prolonged
tongue pressure to the palate is suddenly released, and the sound produced is
reminiscent of that of a foot suddenly released from the mud.
A similar cross-activation process between mouth and hand motor maps is
to be assumed. Analogous to synaesthesia, this coactivation of two distinct
motor maps, ‘‘synkinesia’’, may have played a pivotal role in transforming
gestural language into spoken language. This leads us on to syntax.
Ramachandran suggests that tool manufacture, and especially the more
sophisticated subassembly techniques needed for constructing multipart
tools, became coopted for constructing multipart sentences*manual-
constructional syntax was mirrored into linguistic syntax. Ultimately then,
the ‘‘language acquisition device’’ was formed by a process of exaptation,
building upon tool manufacturing, cross-modal association, and semantics.
Anatomically, this required an integrative interplay between the inferior
parietal lobe, ventral premotor cortex, and superior temporal convolution, all
BOOK REVIEW 353
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
ür
ich
] a
t 0
5:0
6 2
8 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
2 
in the left hemisphere, ‘‘not coincidentally, perhaps, . . . the very areas in which
mirror neurons abound’’ (p. 182). Whether or not mirror neurons are actually
involved here, the connections that Ramachandran establishes between
soundshape associations, correspondences between the meaning of a word
and the morphological configuration of the speech apparatus, while
pronouncing that word, and, finally, the resonance between speech and
hand motor maps, seem logically sound.
The aesthetic sense (Chapters 7 and 8) forms the next leg supporting
tabula Rama. Starting out from ‘‘universal principals of esthetics’’ common
to humans, bowerbirds, and bees, Ramachandran quickly proceeds to what
he labels his ‘‘nine laws of aesthetics’’ (p. 200; listed already in Ramachan-
dran, 2004), which are supposed to be universally human. Some of these laws
are admittedly well-established principles of Gestalt perception, and
Ramachandran discusses each of them, always keeping an evolutionary
perspective and trying to relate present-day aesthetic preferences to certain
survival-relevant perceptual processing characteristics of our ancestors.
Although I agree that the enjoyment (and production) of visual and
sculptural art is probably a uniquely human luxury, I am not convinced
that Ramachandran’s nine artistic universals capture what is unique about
this capacity. However, rather than defend my scepticism, I would like to
comment on one of these universals in particular, dubbed ‘‘The abhorrence
of coincidence’’. Here I accuse Ramachandran of something I bet he has
never been accused of before*I accuse him of being underinclusive in this
brief section. A bare 38 lines are devoted to this enormously central law*
central not only for aesthetics, but also for cognition, scientific reasoning,
and the formation of religious belief. Not only do we ‘‘abhor’’ coincidences
in pictures, we also abhor them in attempts to ‘‘behave randomly’’ (Brugger,
1997). By ‘‘we’’, I refer not only to human beings but to living creatures
down to unicellular organisms and even haploid flagellates (Brugger, Macas,
& Ihlemann, 2002).
We are inclined to overinterpret coincidences in everyday life (‘‘What a
coincidence!’’). In fact, the abhorrence of coincidence comes in degrees, and
as a personality variable it predicts both a scientist’s inclination towards
Type I or Type II errors and a laypersons’ belief in some hidden forms of
causation (Brugger, Regard, Landis, & Graves, 1995). Ramachandran
himself uses the term ‘‘coincidence’’ several times throughout his book. He
appreciates that it is almost certainly a coincidence that Nabokov saw the
letter K as orange in colour (orange being a perfect blend of his parents’
synaesthetic percepts for K: father yellow, mother red). Hence, no further
theoretical elaborations follow (p. 103). On the other hand, he considers the
observation that both synaesthesia and metaphor make nonarbitrary links
between seemingly unrelated percepts or thoughts to be more than ‘‘just a
coincidence’’ (p. 104). Consequently, we are presented with an evolutionary
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account of a common development and shared neural circuits of synaes-
thetic and metaphor processing. On the basis of his low threshold for
coincidence rejection, Ramachandran (deliberately) risks a Type I error,
whereas a scientist preoccupied with counting cones in the eye would almost
certainly see nothing but a coincidental relation between synaesthesia and
metaphor. Ironically, Ramachandran fails to recognise the abhorrence of
coincidences as causally involved in the rubber hand illusion and the illusion
of a phantom head (p. 325, footnote 18). In a nutshell, the law of the
‘‘abhorrence of coincidences’’ may apply to human beings’ aesthetic sense,
but it applies in a much more fundamental sense to life quite generally.
Finally, there is ‘‘leg’’ number seven, the nature of self-awareness. What
made us ‘‘An Ape with a Soul’’ (the title of Chapter 9); how did introspection
evolve? The chapter opens with a case history used to illustrate that ‘‘the self
is not the monolithic entity it [who exactly?] believes itself [who exactly?] to
be’’ (p. 247). Ramachandran then proceeds to define different aspects of the
self: embodiment; privacy, unity, and continuity; social embedding; self-
awareness and free will. Thus, although self-awareness is identified as just
one of aspect of the self (which makes sense), Chapter 9, which Ramachan-
dran declares will ‘‘take a stab at the most challenging problem of all, the
nature of self-awareness’’ (p. xiv), is in fact a chapter on the nature of the self
more generally. It presents an entertaining list of abnormalities in each of the
previously mentioned aspects. Ever more cases are introduced of patients,
whose clinical semiology just has to appear bizarre to nonclinicians.
Accordingly, many popular reviews of Ramachandran’s book (and of
some of his earlier writings) jump on these spectacular cases, superficially
focusing on the names of the respective behavioural abnormalities (‘‘tele-
phone syndrome’’, ‘‘walking corpse syndrome’’), but missing the lesson they
teach us about corporeal awareness and the experience of the self. I am
afraid that many readers will approach this book much like nineteenth-
century people approached the medical curiosities exposed in Barnum’s
circus. Perhaps all this is an unavoidable drawback of an author’s ability to
write in a sexy Sacksian style.
‘‘Embodiment’’, the fact that we tend to identify our self with our body, is
illustrated by the disturbances of, among others, apotemnophilia and
transsexuality. The first disorder, apotemnophilia, refers to the desire of
amputation of a completely normal limb, ‘‘normal’’ with respect to the
‘‘flesh and bone’’ aspects of the body part and its functionality. However,
people with apotemnophilia lack the animation (‘‘Beseelung’’) that usually
makes one identify a limb as one’s own*they lack the ‘‘phantom within’’.
This limb-specific identity disorder is arguably spread over the whole body in
transsexual people; at least with respect to the aspects of gender and sex,
these people feel trapped in the wrong body. Out-of-body experiences are
discussed under the heading ‘‘Unity of the Self ’’, although they could have
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exemplified the aspect of embodiment at least as well (conversely, apotem-
nophilia presents a challenge also to the unity aspect). The aspect of self-
awareness is addressed in the frame of three rather disparate clinical pictures:
Cotard syndrome (the nihilistic delusion of being dead), the identification
with god, and panic attacks. Considering that Ramachandran had earlier
declared this aspect of the self the most uniquely human, this is the least
satisfying section of the chapter. And indeed, this chapter appears to me the
least logically structured of the entire book. Too many symptoms and
syndromes are addressed, the individual sections seem hastily written, and
we lack both an integrative summary and a clearer focus on the ability of the
self to contemplate itself. Perhaps the difficulty here (more than in any other
chapter) is the precise meaning of the key terms. On page 248 philosophy is
mentioned, for once admiringly: ‘‘. . . philosophy has been extremely useful in
maintaining semantic hygiene and emphasizing the need for clarity in
terminology’’. Yet, just one page later, Ramachandran uses the term
‘‘conscious’’ in a rather sloppy way, and it’s not just philosophers who
have cause to complain about a relatively unhygienic mixing of conceptual
levels. He writes: ‘‘We know, after all, that the liver and the spleen are not
conscious; only the brain is’’ and a bit further on: ‘‘. . . only some parts of the
brain are conscious’’ (p. 249). The fact is that neither the brain nor parts of
the brain are any more conscious than liver or spleen are. It is the brain (or
parts of it) that enables a person to be conscious, and it is different parts of the
brain that mediate consciousness as opposed to unconsciousness and that
enable a person to become conscious of herself. More clarity here may have
helped Ramachandran to reach a broader audience.
Before summing up, I would like to comment on the cornucopia of
concrete suggestions that Ramachandran provides regarding experimental
tests of specific hypotheses. This is what I most admire in his writing: The
associations may be remote, the conclusions sometimes bold and sweeping,
but there is never a speculation that is not accompanied by some concrete
suggestion as to how to put it to the test. Some of these suggestions are
tongue-in-cheek, but others could potentially lead to revolutionary insights.
Sometimes a reference would have helped the nonspecialist reader to
recognise that a procedure was simply applied by Ramachandran’s group
in a particular context, and was already known from other contexts (e.g.,
minifying lenses may be used to alleviate phantom limb pain [p. 36] or to
reduce the desire for amputation [p. 257], but the use of size-changing lenses
to influence tactile-somesthetic perception goes back to work by Kennet,
Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001). Likewise, biting on pencils to force the
facial muscles into forming a smile that is not accompanied by the
corresponding affect may confuse the mirror neuron system (p. 143), but
the procedure was famously introduced back in the 1980s by Strack, Martin,
and Stepper (1988). Also, larger experiments, like the neuroimaging study
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with grapheme-colour synaesthetes that started in 2003 and lasted four full
years (p. 100) could have been discussed against the background of similar
work, executed more swiftly and published more than a decade earlier
(Paulesu et al., 1995). In a similar vein, when it comes to questions of
scientific or conceptual priority, a more modest use of the words ‘‘I’’ and
‘‘we’’ would seem desirable: ‘‘Astonishingly, we have found that the
reduplication seen in Capgras syndrome can even involve the patient’s own
self ’’ (p. 277). Capgras delusion involving one’s own self has long been
described in the literature.
Rather than get even more pedantic and mention the few mistranslations
into French and German, some typos, and two or three errors in the
reference list, I will return to the question of just how vague Ramachandran’s
answers to the seven big questions of the uniqueness of the human species
are. The problem with the tabula Rama is not that one or more legs are
rotten, but that collectively they can only guarantee stability as long as they
are placed on an anthropomorphic terrain. Species have evolved to survive in
all manner of barren and inhospitable environments and those that did
survive have all reached a degree of specialisation that makes them unique in
some way or another. Take bonellia viridis, a greenish marine worm, which
prefers to live on relatively shallow, coastal sea floors. The sausage-shaped
female, about 15 cm long, has a thin feeding proboscis of between 1 and 2 m
length which she lets gently float in the water. This tusk produces a
substance, bonellin, that is highly toxic to other small animals (which are
paralysed and eaten up), but lures the genderless larvae of bonellia to
approach. On contact with the tusk, the larvae turn into males, which remain
tiny, are swallowed, and spend the rest of their life in the female’s genital
tract. Those larvae, however, that happen to land on the sea floor develop
into females. The ratio of females to males in this worm population is thus
elegantly regulated: In places with a high density of females, the chance of
making contact with a tusk (and consequently of turning into a male) is high
and, vice versa, if there are few tusks, more females result because most
larvae will make contact with the sea floor. I am not saying that human
males should envy bonellia for being guaranteed an almost entirely sexual life
in a secure place within our partner, but we should admire the uniqueness of
this species’ mechanism for controlling its gender distribution (Berec,
Schembri, & Boukal, 2005). If one day human civilisation is erased by
self-inflicted disaster, it will not be some primate relatives that survive as
Ramachandran assumes. Marine worms, bacteria, or insects will probably be
much better off.
But I agree with Ramachandran when he dismisses either/or dichotomies
and asks: ‘‘Why can’t we be a branch of the animal kingdom and a wholly
unique and gloriously novel phenomenon in the universe?’’ (p. 4). Hence, we
should probably ask: Why can’t Ramachandran’s book be one of many
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books on the uniqueness of human nature and at the same time a novel (even
if largely recycled) and entertaining contribution to the literature on
cognitive neuroscience? I think I will recommend this book to any of my
friends who do not shun pop (neuro)science in principle. Although the Tell-
Tale Brain does contain a lot of pop on the surface, the overall content is
very much Popper, who once clearly stated that ‘‘bold ideas, unjustified
anticipations and speculative thought are our only means for interpreting
nature’’ (Popper, 1959/1980, p. 280).
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